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Abstract 
 
Utilising insights from a qualitative study in the city of Leeds, UK this paper considers issues 
related to the housing of dispersed forced migrants. The tiering of housing entitlement that exist 
within the generic population of dispersed forced migrants (a consequence upon of the 
particular socio-legal status assigned to individuals), and its role in rendering migrants 
susceptible to homelessness is outlined. The adequacy/standard of accommodation made 
available to forced migrants is discussed It is concluded that current arrangements fail to meet 
the basic housing needs of many forced migrants. Any future improvement in this situation will 
require a significant shift in government policy. 
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Accommodating ‘others’? Housing dispersed, forced migrants in the UK 
 
Introduction  
 
The period 1995–2005 has seen unprecedented numbers (567,835 people) applying for 
asylum in the UK (Home Office, 2006; 2005a).  Historically, the majority of forced migrants 
reside in and around London (Pearl and Zetter, 2002), but rules introduced in the Immigration 
and Asylum Act (1999) have seen considerable numbers of asylum seekers ‘dispersed’ to 
towns and cities across Britain. Housing and forced migration remains an under researched 
area, particularly in respect of  empirical studies that prioritise the insights of forced migrants 
and those responsible for their accommodation. This paper explores housing issues in relation 
to dispersed forced migrants by utilising insights from a qualitative study in the city of Leeds, 
West Yorkshire (UK). It is evident, however, that many of the issues and concerns raised in the 
Leeds study have a much wider resonance. Throughout the paper the term forced migrant is 
used as a general label to include the socio-legal categories of international migrant under 
discussion, namely; refugees, asylum seekers, those with humanitarian leave to remain, and 
failed asylum seekers/‘overstayers’. As Gubbay (1999) recognises, migrant communities are 
often characterised by ‘hierarchies of vulnerability’ vis a vis their rights within host nations. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that forced migrants may face common disadvantages (see Kilkey, 
2005), within the generic population a stratified system of housing entitlement exists in respect 
of the four identified groups. 
 
Recent legislation can be seen as a systematic attempt to remove asylum seekers from 
mainstream welfare provision and the continuing omission of asylum seekers (as non citizens), 
from the government’s wider social inclusion agenda remains a deliberate element of 
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immigration policy (Hills and Stewart, 2005). Furthermore, the housing problems of forced 
migrants are also often exacerbated because most are “members of minority ethnic 
communities within the UK and broadly experience the same societal and economic difficulties 
that are experienced by other minorities” (Craig et al. 2004b :7). 
 
The paper is divided into four  subsequent sections. Part one outlines relevant legislative 
developments. It also summarises the importance of socio-legal status in defining the housing 
related rights and opportunities available to forced migrants. Part two explores dispersal policy 
within a local context via an outline of the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) housing 
arrangements in Leeds. A brief description of the methods used in the study which informs the 
paper is also given. Part three considers the adequacy of NASS provision and highlights 
concerns about the standard of accommodation and housing related support available to 
dispersed asylum seekers. The impact of both positive and negative changes in socio-legal 
status and forced migrants’ susceptibility to homelessness are discussed in part four. In 
conclusion, it is argued that future improvement in the housing of forced migrants in the UK 
unlikely given the British government’s continued ‘tough’ approach to asylum policy. 
 
The redefinition and reduction of  forced migrants’ housing rights  
 
The housing rights of forced migrants have been subject to considerable change and reduction 
in the last decade. The Asylum and Immigration Act (1996) effectively removed (with few 
exceptions), asylum seekers’ rights to access permanent local authority (LA) accommodation 
or seek help as homeless persons. It also shifted the costs of supporting asylum seekers from 
the national social security system onto LAs; a move which increased destitution levels (Sales, 
2002; Zetter and Pearl, 2002). As the numbers of forced migrants increased, LAs’ budgets and 
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services (most notably in London and the South East of England where the majority of forced 
migrants were housed), came under mounting pressure. This factor, allied to rising tension 
between some established local communities and asylum seekers, heralded the Immigration 
and Asylum Act (1999). This legislation removed the duty for meeting asylum seekers’ needs 
from LAs and placed it with the newly created National Asylum Support System (NASS), which 
was charged with co-ordinating and funding the accommodation and financial support of all 
asylum seekers arriving in the UK (Robinson, et al. 2003).  
 
The ensuing Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) (NIAA) retained the NASS system 
of dispersal but initiated other important changes. Most controversially  Section 55 of the NIAA 
left thousands of forced migrants who, on entering the UK did not apply for asylum ‘as soon as 
is reasonably practicable’1
  
 effectively homeless and destitute (GLA, 2004; IAP, 2004; Refugee 
Council, 2004a; Shelter, 2003). Although Section 55 has since been successfully challenged in 
the courts, on the basis that it breaches Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, its legacy lingers.  In the first quarter of 2006, 205 applicants (out of a total of 875) 
referred to NASS for Section 55 assessment were deemed ineligible for NASS support (Home 
Office, 2006). 
The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act (2004) further curtailed forced 
migrants’ housing rights. New powers to terminate NASS support for failed asylum 
seekers/‘overstayers’ with dependant children were introduced. A new obligation on adult failed 
asylum seekers with young families to accept voluntary repatriation or face the possibility of 
destitution and their children being taken into care was also instigated. Access for failed asylum 
seekers to ‘hardcase’ accommodation also became conditional on them performing specified 
                                                 
1 Originally defined as within 48 hours of entering the UK, subsequently extended to 72 hours. 
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community activities. Finally, the Act, for housing purposes, established, an automatic local 
connection between NASS accommodated migrants and their dispersal area (IND, 2004a, b).  
 
A  tiering of housing entitlement 
 
Immigration status has long been used to restrict or formally exclude certain migrants from 
access to housing (Waddington, 1998) and it is often a key factor in defining a migrant’s 
vulnerability to homelessness (Edgar et al. 2004). The legislative changes of the past decade, 
outlined above, have widened the gulf between the social rights enjoyed by UK citizens and 
those available to forced migrants. As Figure 1 illustrates, the particular socio-legal status that 
is assigned to an individual forced migrant at various times in the asylum process effectively 
defines the housing rights and opportunities available to each migrant.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Destitute asylum seekers can apply for NASS support. Following an induction period spent in 
emergency accommodation, NASS permits clients to choose one of two support options; 
accommodation and subsistence or subsistence only. For those who require housing, eligibility 
is conditional on migrants accepting compulsory, no choice, ‘dispersal’ to a specified location 
across the UK. NASS meets its housing responsibilities by subcontracting to a variety of 
accommodation providers including LAs, private companies/landlords and to a lesser extent 
other registered social landlords (RSLs) (Sales, 2002). The original aim of dispersing migrants 
to particular cluster areas on the basis of common language appears to have been superseded 
by a drive to secure cheap, empty housing (Carter and El-Hassan, 2003; Robinson et al. 2003; 
Finch, 2001).  
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In principle refugees and those with humanitarian protection (HP) status enjoy the same 
housing rights and options as UK citizens. However, in practice several factors may curtail 
available housing opportunities. Changes introduced in September 2005 rescinded refugees’ 
automatic right to indefinite leave to remain and replaced it an initial period of temporary leave 
to remain in the UK. The government is on record as stating that if the situation in a person’s 
country of origin “has not improved after 5 years we would grant them permanent status 
otherwise we expect them to return.” (Home Office, 2005b :23). The new temporary nature of 
refugee/HP status removes the option of taking out a mortgage; so housing choices are 
essentially limited to the social or private rented sectors. Changes introduced under the Asylum 
and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act (2004) establish, for housing purposes, an 
automatic local connection between NASS accommodated migrants and their dispersal area 
(IND, 2004a, b). This was introduced to alleviate pressure on LAs and accommodation in the 
South East of England as, previously, many of those granted refugee or HP status have 
subsequently left their dispersal area and gravitated towards London (Home Office, 2004b). 
However, for successful asylum claimants, future rights to social housing and/or homelessness 
provisions are effectively limited to their local (i.e. dispersal) area. As subsequent discussions 
illustrate, whilst a positive change in status (to either refugee or HP), theoretically brings with it 
enhanced housing related rights, tangible opportunities to exercise those rights are limited by 
the short transition period allowed for the move from NASS accommodation to mainstream 
provision and/or the shortage of available social housing within a defined dispersal area.  
 
Failed asylum seekers must leave NASS accommodation within 28 days of notification by the 
Home Office. Such migrants, under specified circumstances, (e.g. no safe route for return, 
illness), may be able to access ‘hardcase’ support under Section 4 of the IAA (1999). This is 
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intentionally offered “in the most basic way possible” (HMG, 2004: 25) while arrangements to 
remove failed asylum seekers are finalised and is highly conditional (see figure 1). The tight 
eligibility criteria of Section 4 and administrative deficiencies in NASS have resulted in 
substantial numbers of failed asylum seekers in urgent need of accommodation being denied 
support (CAB, 2002). Many others have simply left NASS accommodation and effectively 
disappeared. Parliament has recognised that there are ‘considerable numbers’ whose claim 
has failed, living in unknown locations without any rights to shelter or basic welfare (HAC 
Report, 2004). The impact of new rules 2
 
 which permit LAs to provide ‘hardcase’ 
accommodation to failed asylum seekers who are unable to leave the UK remains unknown, 
but homelessness and destitution continues to be a reality for many (ICAR, 2006).  
Housing forced migrants in Leeds 
 
The Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Consortium for Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
(established in 2000), consists of ten local authorities and fulfils several important housing roles. 
It negotiates and manages housing and support contracts with NASS on behalf of LAs and 
consortium members have a duty to provide suitable accommodation. It is also charged with 
drafting and implementing an integration strategy for refugees entering the community. Finally, 
the consortium also has responsibilities in connection to the harassment of forced migrants and 
any community tensions that may arise between those dispersed to the region and the local 
host population (YHRCASR, 2003).  
 
                                                 
2 Clause 37 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (2006). 
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Yorkshire and Humberside has the highest regional population (22% of the UK total)3, of NASS 
accommodated asylum seekers (Home Office, 2006) with the region’s biggest number resident 
in Leeds. The most up to date, statistics show 1,879 dispersed asylum seekers living in Leeds 
(YHRCASR, 2006a)4
 
. Forced migrants are mainly housed in the Leeds 7, 8, 9 and 11 postcode 
districts.  Additionally the Leeds Destitution Steering Group estimate that at least a further 3000 
failed asylum seekers were resident in Leeds in June 2006.  
As a member of the consortium Leeds City Council (LCC) was contracted to provide 336 
properties to NASS until October 2005. In June 2003 the council also negotiated a separate 
contract with the Home Office to provide 65 spaces in the ‘Hillside’ induction centre for newly 
dispersed asylum seekers (LCC, 2004). Three other agencies were also contracted to supply 
appropriate accommodation to dispersed asylum seekers; the Angel Group, Clearsprings, 
(private companies) and a not for profit organisation, Safehaven Yorkshire. These three 
landlords provided approximately two thirds of asylum seekers’ accommodation in Leeds, some 
of which they procured through sub letting arrangements with other local, private landlords 
(Wilson, 2001). Since July 2006 new accommodation contracts have been negotiated by NASS. 
In future the ten local authorities in the Yorkshire and Humberside Consortium will provide 
approximately half of NASS accommodation in the region. The rest will be provided by three 
private companies Angel Group, United Property Management and Priority Properties 
Northwest (YHRCASR, 2006b). 
 
The Leeds study: an overview of methods and sampling  
 
                                                 
3 The North West of England (17%) and Scotland (15%) also house significant proportions of the 
NASS accommodated population of asylum seekers (Home Office 2006). 
4 There are also another 205 asylum seekers receiving NASS ‘subsistence only’ support in Leeds 
(Home Office, 2006). 
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The Leeds research used qualitative techniques (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Mason, 2002) to 
explore the role of formal and informal welfare agencies and the strategies of forced migrants 
themselves in meeting housing and financial needs. In total thirty four respondents (23 forced 
migrants and 11 key informants involved in the delivery of welfare services for forced migrants) 
took part in the fieldwork which consisted of two sets of qualitative interviews and a mini focus 
group. In order to capture a diversity of forced migrants a purposive non random sampling 
technique was used to select respondents. Subsequently, interviews were conducted with 5 
refugees, 7 asylum seekers, 6 people with subsidiary humanitarian protection status and 5 
failed asylum seekers/‘overstayers’. Thirteen of the forced migrants were male and ten were 
female with ages ranged between 21 and 57 years. Respondents identified 9 countries of origin; 
Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, 
Somalia, and Zimbabwe.5
 
 
Interviews were conducted in Leeds in 2004 and lasted on average 60 minutes. Two ethical 
principles underpinned the fieldwork; informed consent and confidentiality. All migrants were 
offered the use of a suitable interpreter but the majority (21) chose to be interviewed in English. 
Interviews were recorded on audiotape and transcribed verbatim. Subsequent transcripts were 
anonymised, assigned a code number (e.g FM1, KI2) and analysed using grid analysis and 
thematic coding techniques (Ritchie et al. 2003). A Nudist 6 computer software package was 
used to assist this process.  
 
The inadequacy of NASS housing  
 
                                                 
5 In order to ensure respondents’ anonymity personal information concerning the gender, nationality etc. 
of each forced migrant is omitted. A fuller discussion of sampling, data gathering/analysis and ethical 
considerations is available at http: (web reference deleted to ensure  anonymity  of author at referee 
stage ).  
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When discussing the adequacy and standard of NASS housing only one of the 6 asylum 
seekers experiencing NASS provision at time of interview deemed their accommodation to be 
satisfactory. Others were more critical.  
When you arrive here as an asylum seeker they put you in a house where the carpet is 
very dirty, they can’t clean the carpet! Where your room is leaking when it’s raining, 
where the kitchen is not good. So everything becomes very bad for you and you feel 
really, really bad. I came here looking for safety and security but they are putting me in 
this house[despairingly](FM22 asylum seeker). 
The most damming tale was related by an asylum seeker who for three years had (legally) 
worked in Leeds at a NASS contracted private housing provider. He related a number of 
grievances about the housing system, ranging from the complexity and length of time taken to 
deal with complaints to the inadequacy of provision.  
One family… one lady with two babies her house was leaking from the toilet, from the 
bathroom. The carpets were very, very bad, they were torn everywhere. The sofas were 
very, very bad condition, believe me if you threw it away nobody would take it... The 
kitchen was leaking water, the wallpaper all came off from the lounge because of the 
water. The water was coming down, she had TV it was coming on top of the [electricity] 
sockets…it was very dangerous. I took it to NASS five or six times about this family and 
nothing really happened…[finally] The ceiling came down on the floor and they changed 
her house (FM19 asylum seeker). 
A more mixed response arose when forced migrants who had subsequently left NASS 
accommodation discussed their past experiences. Approximately 50% of these respondents 
declared NASS supplied accommodation to be adequate, but serious shortcomings were 
highlighted by the remaining half. Issues routinely raised included poor standards of 
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accommodation, overcrowding, a lack of orientation and support services, and providers 
disregarding asylum seekers’ complaints about standards or poor repair. 
Actually it was very, very bad … my room we are two persons in one bed; single bed for 
six months … At that time I can’t speak English, just yes/no. We are going every time to 
social services, we didn’t know anywhere. Where is [private housing provider]? Where is 
Refugee Council? We didn’t know nothing… They [private housing provider] promise us 
we will come to check your house but they didn’t …   one blanket for two people.  If [we 
get] two blankets I can go on the floor … Nothing……  
[Respondent continues] On Christmas Day we hadn’t had electric for two or three 
weeks … the water in the kitchen, it was leaking into the electricity… They said yes we 
are coming to fix it but they didn’t.  At night time it exploded. The neighbour called 
somebody to come to check… They didn’t come back for two or three weeks (FM15 
failed asylum seeker/‘overstayer’). 
The inadequacies of NASS provision highlighted by respondents are indicative of a wider issue 
across the UK. A range of studies and reviews suggest that substandard accommodation and 
poor client support are persistent and widespread problems (NAO, 2005; Perry, 2005, 2003; 
Craig et al. 2004a, b; Spencer, 2004; Robinson et al. 2003; Garvie, 2001;Wilson, 2001).  
 
NASS housing: a public/private divide?  
 
Deficiencies in the quality of housing and related support supplied by NASS contracted private 
providers feature in previous research. Garvie’s (2001) study is highly critical of the private 
rented sector. Wilson (2001) also found that some dispersed asylum seekers housed by the 
private sector appeared to receive little orientation and/or ongoing support. More recent work 
suggests that private companies focused on generating profits from NASS contracts (rather 
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than providing suitable accommodation and services), may also be a contribute to ongoing 
housing problems (Perry, 2005, 2003; Graig et al. 2004a, b). Whilst LAs cannot be seen as 
totally exempt from criticism (Pearl and Zetter, 2002), our study supports the view that, on 
occasions, a two tier system exists with local authorities providing a better level of housing 
service than private providers. In our discussions with respondents complaints were more 
prevalent among those migrants who were housed by private companies rather than the local 
authority. As our fieldwork drew to a close the Home Office was also reported as investigating 
complaints against a particular company (see Willis, 2004). 
 
Several of the key informants in the Leeds study also noted that a lack of central guidance from 
NASS (particularly in the early days of dispersal), allowed private companies to provide an 
inadequate or inappropriate housing service. 
Local authority housing tends to be reasonably good, ex council houses in not 
particularly desirable areas that they will do up. They’ll have all the basics and a fairly 
good standard. When the whole dispersal thing started off private housing providers 
were a different kettle of fish and they would, and still do contract to a another landlord, 
who will contract to another landlord and you have a whole series of landlords going 
down to a person who might have one or two houses and there was no monitoring down 
there and some of the conditions were pretty much appalling … Things have improved 
over time. Private housing providers, who have made a fair deal of money out of this,… 
NASS have started to check on things (KI2, the Leeds manager of a national charity). 
Earlier criticisms of standards appear to be having some effect on policy. From late 2004 NASS 
instigated a policy of 100% property inspection linked to steps to ensure the routine 
maintenance and repair of accommodation (Craig et al. 2004b). It is clear, however, that 
NASS’s inexperience in managing housing, and its willingness to devolve power to individual 
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private contractors (who then sub-contract to others), has led to variable and, on occasions, 
sub standard provision.  
NASS is certainly not very experienced yet… so the kind of housing management issues 
that a social housing provider or social landlord and local authority would be familiar with, 
overcrowding, transfers, those sorts of issues its just not experienced in dealing with and, 
therefore, hasn’t worked out its policies. It relies very much on providers to do the 
sensible thing.. if they don’t know what the sensible thing is there is no knowledge and 
experience base back at NASS to give them proper guidance (KI10, housing  official). 
Stansfield (2001) makes a similar point when discussing private contractors. Whereas RSLs 
such as housing associations and LAs may possess the staff, experience, and knowledge to 
provide adequate housing and support services to vulnerable groups, both NASS, and many of 
the private companies it has concluded contracts with, appear to lack substantive expertise. 
This is perhaps one root of subsequent problems.  
 
Dispersal policy has been characterised as “little more than a scramble to locate vacant and 
reasonably priced accommodation” (Robinson et al. 2003: 146). Faced with growing numbers 
of asylum applicants, the UK government established NASS as a new and distinct body to 
oversee the provision of housing and support for dispersed forced migrants. NASS was a hasty 
solution to pressing problems. The resultant ‘fragmentation of service delivery’ (Zetter and 
Pearl, 2000) and the inadequate and substandard housing endured by some asylum seekers 
are outcomes of a poorly conceived policy, implemented with little strategic direction (Pearl and 
Zetter, 2002).  
 
The underlying reasons for the continuing failure of the NASS system to meet the basic 
housing needs of all its clients need to be addressed. New Labour has long advocated ‘joined 
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up’ government and inter-agency partnerships as an appropriate response to housing and 
associated policy (Lund, 2002). NASS, which seeks to provide local dispersal accommodation 
by entering into contracts with range of public, private and voluntary actors, could be 
characterised, somewhat optimistically, as a ‘joined up’ network of governance. A more critical 
analysis which emphasises the complexity of current arrangements as a potential cause of 
many of the housing problems faced by NASS clients may, however, be more appropriate 
(Author, 2005). 
 
Changes in status as a trigger to homelessness  
 
One effect of the development of the separate NASS housing system for asylum seekers is that 
the resolution of individuals’ asylum claims and their subsequent transition in socio-legal status 
renders many forced migrants susceptible to homelessness and/or destitution. For those who 
receive a positive decision (i.e. are granted refugee or humanitarian protection (HP) status), 
this is due to the short (28 day) transition period allowed for the move from the NASS system 
into mainstream accommodation and a general shortage of available social housing.  
 
Several key informants stated that a lack of co-ordination between agencies often leads to 
much shorter periods of notice, consequently finding new accommodation is often impossible 
(cf. Perry, 2003; Craig et al. 2004a; YHSCAR, 2003). In 2003 Leeds Council received a total of 
337 housing applications from people who recorded their cause of homelessness as being a 
refugee. In the same year the Council received an additional 276 requests for re-housing from 
refugees (LCC, 2004). Four of our 11 respondents with refugee or humanitarian leave status 
lived in various hostels or slept on friends’ floors before finding a new home. Others were still 
waiting to secure mainstream accommodation at time of interview. 
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[Respondent is told] ‘You have to move. NASS won’t pay [housing contractor] any more 
rent.’ I said where am I going to go? And he said go to a hostel. I told him I cant… but he 
said go. I left and was homeless (FM20 refugee). 
I’m still in a hostel [after 1 year], I don’t know what to do to plan for the future…If I get my 
own house I can get a job and go to college change some things in my life (FM17 
discretionary leave to remain). 
Aside from a vulnerability to homelessness, those who gain refugee/HP status face multiple 
disadvantages when trying to secure mainstream accommodation. Many find themselves 
allocated to areas where social housing is already under severe pressure (Perry, 2005). Single 
males with leave to remain are often not priority cases for re-housing (YHCASR, 2003) and, as 
respondents reported in our study, families or those with impairments often struggle to find 
suitable housing. Within Leeds a number of RSLs have been attempting to meet the needs of 
new refugees (Perry, 2005). More generally, however, in spite of their remit to support 
vulnerable groups, RSLs across the UK have yet to play a major role in meeting the housing 
needs of refugees (Grewal, 2004). 
 
The limited housing options of those who receive a positive outcome to their asylum claim are 
clear; 
It’s a lot more difficult to access suitable accommodation as a refugee as the housing 
stocks get lower and lower in the city. …[but] you don’t have any other options. There 
isn’t an option to buy because you’ve got no capital. More often than not you’ve not had 
secure employment so that is just not an option. Private rented, as we all know, can be 
hit and miss across the city. Quite often they need a bond… so quite often it’s not always 
a reasonable…. and the council stock is slowly dwindling. So it’s low demand areas 
really where people are more likely to be able to access accommodation quite quickly. 
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Areas that people don't want to live in for one reason or another or where the houses 
aren’t as nice as other parts of the city (KI5 manager, local authority housing provider). 
Furthermore, as previously noted, the capacity for refugees to secure social housing or 
homelessness support by moving to other, perhaps more favourable, locations has been 
curtailed by the new rules of ‘local connection’ recently established in the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act (2004).  
 
Although there are no current plans to increase the 28 day period the government has stated 
that it aims to prevent homelessness among refugees and ensure their access to suitable 
housing in the longer term.  The ‘SUNRISE’ programme which is currently being piloted6
 
 
involves the production of a ‘personal integration plan’ in the 28 day period and follow up visits 
from a support worker for successful asylum claimants in the ensuing twelve months. An 
interest free ‘refugee integration loan’ administered in the same way as the Social Fund will 
also be made available. It is envisaged that migrants will use this to pay landlords’ deposits and 
other housing set up costs.  
 
 
Homelessness and destitution among failed asylum seekers  
 
As forced migrants’ susceptibility to homelessness is becoming nationally recognised (Shelter, 
2004; Spencer, 2004) emergent policies aimed at providing solutions to those who are granted 
leave to remain are to be welcomed. The outlook for those who receive a negative asylum 
decision, however, remains bleak. The government is clear that the SUNRISE programme is 
                                                 
6 In Glasgow, West London, Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield. 
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specifically targeted at refugees or those with HP status rather than failed asylum 
seekers/‘overstayers’. Those whose claims are turned down, but who are not returned to their 
country of origin (either because they go into hiding or because the government is not enforcing 
their return for human rights reasons), effectively have no rights to welfare; nor are they 
allowed to take up paid employment. All five of the failed asylum seekers/‘overstayers’ and the 
Section 55 asylum seeker within our study were homeless at time of interview. This sometimes 
led to periods of rough sleeping on the streets. 
To be honest sometimes, depending on the weather conditions we just find something to 
see us through to the next morning… just find a corner to sleep in… At one stage it was 
terrible, very cold in the night and we didn’t have enough to cover ourselves and it was 
traumatic. All night you are shaking, you are trembling (FM18 section 55 asylum seeker). 
Those with some form of (usually illegal) paid work often rent rooms on an insecure short term 
basis from ‘friends’. Such ‘friendships’ are routinely the result of the chance recognition of a 
fellow national in the street (cf. Craig et al. 2004b).  
On the streets it’s easy to talk to anyone, ‘hi hi please if you know somebody with a room 
just tell me. This is my telephone number, contact me please’… It depends, sometimes 
two months, three months I am living in one house. If you like each other you stay in the 
house but if I get a problem with them I have to change (FM15 failed asylum 
seeker/‘overstayer’). 
You can’t go to the city council or somewhere else and tell them I need a house, you 
have to live in somebody else’s house. .. My friend  got a city council house. I live in his 
house and I have to pay more because they know I can’t find another house, that’s why 
they’re pushing me to pay more (FM12 failed asylum seeker/‘overstayer’). 
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Transitory accommodation arrangements are part of everyday life for failed asylum seekers 
and other undocumented migrants who are trying to keep one step ahead of the immigration 
authorities (Edgar et al. 2004). FM15 had lodged with 8 or 9 different people in a short period at 
the time of interview. Accommodation can be offered free, or for a nominal charge, but on some 
occasions the interactions have a distinctly economic dimension. FM12 was paying £40 per 
week plus utility bills whilst taking a room with a refugee who had secured a social housing flat 
for £45 a week rent. The weak position of undocumented migrants vis a vis the housing market 
and rights to social housing renders them vulnerable to exploitation from bad landlords and 
also other less principled migrants. As Gibney (2004 p.103) notes,  
The ties of ethnicity and nationality that so often serve to make survival without proper 
documentation possible can just as quickly turn into fetters that facilitate exploitation 
(cited by Edgar et al. 2001 p.13). 
Forced migrants who are working illegally and who are otherwise faced with the street have few 
alternatives, other than applying for ‘hardcase’ support. Two failed asylum 
seekers/‘overstayers’ within the study who were sleeping on various people’s floors at the time 
of interview had pursued this option but been refused. Others ruled it out on the grounds that 
any ensuing repatriation would render them open to persecution on return to their homeland.  
 
Those forced migrants who lack the ability to informally pay rent are totally reliant on charitable 
provision to secure basic shelter. In Leeds the charity ‘Shortstop’ provides limited emergency 
accommodation; similar schemes operate elsewhere (Housing Today, 2004). However, it was 
widely acknowledged by respondents in our study that failed asylum seekers/‘overstayers’ 
increasingly rely on other forced migrants, to meet their basic housing needs (cf. Craig et al. 
2004b; Spencer, 2004). Shelter is provided by other asylum seekers living in NASS 
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accommodation or by migrants whose socio-legal status enables them to access mainstream 
social housing. 
A house that should accommodate 2 people has actually got 20 people staying in it 
because they’ve not let their friends sleep on the streets. They’ve invited them into their 
own NASS accommodation, so there’s a lot of overcrowding going on (KI5 manager, 
local authority housing provider). 
I know of some houses where 10 people live together because one of them gets 4 years 
and the council give him a house and another 9 people are refused. They don’t have any 
other place to go, they stay with a friend (FM11 granted exceptional leave to remain.) 
Beyond overcrowding issues, when asylum seekers provide shelter for others they are in 
breach of NASS regulations and run the risk of losing their own accommodation. The 
importance of mutual support was tacitly acknowledged by a government minister (Beverly 
Hughes) who, when defending the withdrawal of support under Section 55 rules, stated “that 
the vast majority of those who are refused support do not become destitute, finding support 
from friends, family or community groups” (Home Office, 2003 p3).  
 
The potentially positive role of refugee community organisations (RCOs) in providing support 
for forced migrants has been widely noted (Carter & El-Hassan, 2003; Zetter and Pearl, 2000; 
Carey-Wood 1997) and a number of key informants discussed their growing role in providing 
basic shelter for destitute forced migrants. It is clear, however, that ad hoc support provided by 
RCOs is insufficient to meet increasing needs. The transitory and informal nature of many 
RCOs, (Kelly, 2003) and their limited funding, indicate that many are ill equipped to take on a 
bigger role in meeting housing needs (Zetter and Pearl, 2004).  
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As many failed asylum seekers simply disappear when their claim is turned down the national 
extent of destitution among forced migrants remains unknown. It appears, however, that 
substantial numbers are homeless. In April 2004 the London boroughs were supporting 34,818 
destitute asylum seekers (Brangwyn, 2004) and a snapshot survey records 504 incidences of 
destitute forced migrants seeking help from five agencies within Leeds between 15th November 
and 17th December 2004 (LDSG, 2005). The suspension of Section 55, recent increases in 
repatriation rates and proposals to fast track claims and removal procedures (Home Office, 
2005b) may, in time, reduce the overall numbers involved. At present, however, many of the 
estimated 250,000 (Migration Watch, 2004) migrants who receive a negative asylum decision, 
disappear into a twilight world in which they sleep rough or on friends floors and/or enter into 
informal short term sub-letting arrangements.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Problems persist in relation to both the NASS system of accommodation and policies aimed at 
enhancing the settlement and integration of refugees. A survey of refugee services highlighted 
that housing was the biggest issue of concern among refugees with 64% of respondents stating 
it was the key area requiring improvement (Peckham et al. 2004). Craig et al. similarly note that 
“above all other areas of provision, housing was singled out for the most criticism” (2004b: 69).  
 
Kilkey (2005) notes that forced migrants share many common experiences of disadvantage 
regardless of their specific social-legal status and argues that such distinctions are often 
meaningless and counterproductive. This present paper has illustrated that to varying degrees 
all forced migrants regardless of particular status are potentially vulnerable to poor or 
substandard housing, homelessness and isolation. Furthermore, racists and those overtly 
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hostile to people who are seeking refuge in the UK do not appear over concerned with the 
details of socio-legal differentiation. It is, therefore, often appropriate to pursue strategies that 
build rights to security, housing and basic welfare for all forced migrants as part of wider race 
equality and anti-racism frameworks (Kilkey, 2005; Perry 2005). To some extent the allocation 
of specific socio-legal categories is an artificial exercise, but it is far from meaningless. The 
vulnerability of forced migrants to homelessness in particular is linked to socio-legal status 
(Edgar et al. 2004). The allocation of a specific socio-legal category has an important 
conditioning effect on the rights and options available to particular forced migrants at any given 
time. This is most starkly illustrated when an individual receives notification that their asylum 
claim has failed. NASS provision ceases and rights to even the most basic shelter and support 
are denied unless migrants co-operate with enforced repatriation.  
 
The track record of both public and private housing agencies in relation to dispersed forced 
migrants is, at best, mixed (Phillips, 2004; Perry, 2003), at worse inadequate (Pearl and Zetter, 
2002). The system of NASS support focuses solely on minimal provision. Asylum seekers’ 
housing options are further limited because they are not allowed to undertake paid work. They 
are routinely housed in poor, under resourced neighbourhoods where they may face 
resentment and hostility. Subsidies allocated by central government to LAs in respect of 
providing services for forced migrants do not meet the full costs involved. Furthermore, the 
complexity of the NASS system, hurried decision making and a lack of communication between 
the various agencies involved all hinder the delivery of high quality housing provision (Perry, 
2005; Craig et al. 2004a). Against the backdrop of falling numbers of asylum applicants, NASS 
has recently renegotiated its original five year contracts. Past concerns about the failures of 
certain private companies to provide adequate accommodation and support appear to have 
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been sidelined and NASS remains committed to maintaining a ‘mixed economy’ of local 
authority and private housing providers (Home Office, 2005c).   
 
There are, however, limits to what housing agencies, whether public or private, can achieve in 
the presently hostile policy environment (Perry, 2003). Currently, large numbers of asylum 
seekers rely on highly conditional, and at times inadequate, NASS provision. Additionally, a 
significant but unknown number of failed asylum seekers have no rights to access social 
housing or homelessness provisions and remain reliant on the charity of their contemporaries 
and/or illegal work to meet basic housing needs. Meanwhile those granted refugee or 
humanitarian protection status must compete for scare resources with other vulnerable groups 
for scare housing provision. The Leeds study highlights that for many dispersed forced 
migrants serious housing problems persist. Concerns about the standard of accommodation, 
susceptibility to homelessness and limited relationships with new neighbours remain enduring 
features of many dispersed forced migrant’ lives. A more fundamental shift outside the confines 
of housing policy will need to occur if significant improvement is to be made in the future. This 
remains unlikely given the government’s continuing commitment to be ‘as tough as old boots’ 
on asylum (see Flynn, 2003). In 2000 an Audit Commission report concluded that,  
Current arrangements offer no guarantee that asylum seekers needs will be met 
comprehensively or consistently, due to shortcomings at local and national levels 
(2000:11).  
In spite of the best efforts of some, and a limited degree of progress in certain areas (rf. Phillips, 
2006), it would be hard to avoid a similar conclusion today. 
 
Socio-legal status Right to remain Housing related 
rights 
Conditioning 
factors 
Right 
to 
work 
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Refugee 
(those whose claim for 
asylum has been 
accepted) 
Temporary - 5 years in 
the first instance 7
 
 
Can join local 
authority waiting 
lists 
Access to 
Housing Benefit 
Can seek support 
as a homeless 
person 
Temporary 
right to remain 
limits option of 
owner 
occupation  
Yes 
Humanitarian 
protection/discretionary 
leave 
(granted to those the gov. 
recognises would be in 
danger if returned to 
country of origin) 
Temporary - up to 3 
years 
(removable/renewable) 
Can join local 
authority waiting 
lists 
Access to 
Housing Benefit 
Can seek support 
as a homeless 
person 
Temporary 
right to remain 
limits option of 
owner 
occupation 
Yes 
Asylum seeker 
(those making a claim for 
refugee status) 
For length of claim NASS 
accommodation 
Must be 
destitute 
No choice 
dispersal 
No8
Failed asylum seeker 
 
(those whose claim for 
refugee status has been 
refused) 
No right to remain None or in certain 
circumstances 
Section 4 
‘Hardcase’ 
support 
Must be 
destitute 
Acceptance 
(potentially) of 
secondary 
dispersal across 
UK  
Signing a 
voluntary 
repatriation 
document 
Performance of 
specified 
community 
duties 
No 
 
Figure 1. Forced migrants and the tiering of housing entitlements 
 
 
1 Prior to changes announced in 2005 individuals granted refugee status were given indefinite leave to 
remain in the UK. All the refugees in our study had indefinite leave. Since September 1st 2005 all 
refugees (with the exception of the small number who enter under the Gateway Protection Programme 
who retain indefinite leave to remain), are granted 5 years temporary leave. The government position is 
now such that if the situation in a person’s country of origin “has not improved after 5 years we would 
grant them permanent status otherwise we expect them to return” (Home Office, 2005b :23). 
 
                                                 
7 Prior to changes announced in 2005 individuals granted refugee status were given indefinite leave to 
remain in the UK. All the refugees in our study had indefinite leave. Since September 1st 2005 all 
refugees (with the exception of the small number who enter under the Gateway Protection Programme 
who retain indefinite leave to remain), are granted 5 years temporary leave. The government position is 
now such that if the situation in a person’s country of origin “has not improved after 5 years we would 
grant them permanent status otherwise we expect them to return” (Home Office, 2005b :23). 
8  Under Article 11 of  European Council Directive 2003/9/EC any asylum seeker who has not received 
an initial decision within 12 months of their claim is able to apply to the Home Office for permission to 
work. 
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